

AD-A284 239




Operational Leader Development: Fostering the Institutionalization of Intellectual Innovation

A Monograph
by

Major John F. Agoglia

Infantry



94-29015



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term AY 93-94

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

94 9 06 08 6

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 20 MAY 1992	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE OPERATIONAL LEADER DEVELOPMENT: FOSTERING THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL INNOVATION.			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAT. JOHN F. AGGOLIA				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS, 66027			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES XX				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT XX APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)				
14. SUBJECT TERMS			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 61	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT (UNCLASSIFIED)	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	

ABSTRACT

The Army must develop leaders who are capable of managing uncertainty and change; leaders who can intellectually innovate. Intellectual change and innovation is the basis of appropriate and enduring physical/organizational change. How an organization learns from experience impacts on how it anticipates the future, and how it adapts to function effectively in the current environment.

Transforming the Army into a learning organization will allow the Army to institutionalize the fostering of intellectual innovation because learning, anticipating, and adapting to manage change are the norm. Individuals' emotional and intellectual maturation impact on their ability to learn. If they can not learn they can not lead because they will be incapable of participating in team development/learning.

Restructuring the Army's education by combining the concept of the 21st Century classroom and the experiential learning method of instruction would encourage team development/learning and revitalize the Army's education system. Restructuring of the education system would require restructuring the promotion system.

The Army would have to develop a shared vision and collectively define success in terms of instructor staff, and command assignments. Restructuring of the promotion system would reduce competition and encourage cooperation. Reduction of competition reduces the fear and penalty of failure that inhibits innovative behavior. Reduction of fear encourages the organization's members to challenge and change our warfighting doctrine. The vision of the Army as a learning organization in which intellectual innovation is continually fostered is powerful and achievable.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major John J. Agoglia

Title of Monograph: Operational Leader Development: Fostering
the Institutionalization of Intellectual
Innovation

Approved by:

Robert H. Berlin Monograph Director
Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.

Suzanne Fenterot Director, School of
COL Gregory Fontenot, MA, MMAS Advanced Military
Studies

Philip J. Brookes Director, Graduate
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Program

Accepted this 6th day of May 1994

Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

ABSTRACT

The Army must develop leaders who are capable of managing uncertainty and change; leaders who can intellectually innovate. Intellectual change and innovation is the basis of appropriate and enduring physical/organizational change. How an organization learns from experience impacts on how it anticipates the future and how it adapts to function effectively in the current environment.

Transforming the Army into a learning organization will allow the Army to institutionalize the fostering of intellectual innovation because learning, anticipating, and adapting to manage change are the norm. Individuals' emotional and intellectual maturation impact on their ability to learn. If they can not learn they can not lead because they will be incapable of participating in team development/learning.

Restructuring the Army's education by combining the concept of the 21st Century classroom and the experiential learning method of instruction would encourage team development/learning and revitalize the Army's education system. Restructuring of the education system would require restructuring the promotion system.

The Army would have to develop a shared vision and collectively define success in terms of instructor staff, and command assignments. Restructuring of the promotion system would reduce competition and encourage cooperation. Reduction of competition reduces the fear and penalty of failure that inhibits innovative behavior. Reduction of fear encourages the organization's members to challenge and change our warfighting doctrine. The vision of the Army as a learning organization in which intellectual innovation is continually fostered is powerful and achievable.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.....	1
I. The Theory for Change.....	5
II. Does the U.S. Army Have a Learning Disability.....	22
III. Recommendations and Conclusions.....	31
Figures	
Figure 1.....	4
Figure 2.....	9
Figure 3.....	19
Appendices	
Appendix A Covey's Seven Habits.....	39
Appendix B The Learning by Experience Model.	46
Endnotes.....	49
Bibliography.....	57

The times we live in are times of profound change, dramatic and fundamental change - political, ideological, and technical. We must adapt to that change, and we must grow.

GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, 25 May 93

INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE

The continuing patterns of unprecedented and unexpected events from the past four years indicates that the rest of the twentieth century will be a period of tumultuous change.¹ Change of this magnitude will challenge the Army's senior leaders and create uncertainty in the national and international community. The Army is at a crossroads. The Army's leaders can either be controlled by the change and find themselves always trying to adapt or they can embark on a path that allows them to ". . . control rather than react to change."² History is replete with examples of military organizations that failed to innovate and control change. If the United States Army fails to anticipate change and has to react to events it fails to control the result could well be disaster or defeat in a future conflict.

There are three methods of controlling change; reduce uncertainty, manage uncertainty, or a combination of both. Reduction of uncertainty drives decision making closer and closer to simple yes or no choices. Managing uncertainty drives decision making towards the most flexible course of action. Reduction of uncertainty empowers individuals. If, with all the relevant information, the decision is a simple yes or no the threat of making a bad choice is minimal. In this case there is

less need to seek consensus. Conversely, when managing uncertainty there is no definitive answer only probabilities. The threat of making a wrong decision is always present. Consensus is required to improve the probability of the chosen course of action by getting everyone to work towards the same purpose.

Some theorists believe technology allows man to reduce uncertainty. This is a major theme in the book War and Antiwar by noted futurists Alvin and Hiedi Toffler. They believe that the mastering of informational technology by current economic powers will lead to a new period of economic development. A period of development in which economic powers create wealth and power by managing information technology.³ Pursuit of technology that can reduce uncertainty is a worthy goal.

However, uncertainty has not yet been eliminated nor will it be in the foreseeable future. Therefore the Army must develop leaders who are capable of managing uncertainty and change; leaders who can innovate. Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan believes that intellectual change and innovation by the Army's leaders will be the basis of appropriate and enduring physical or organizational change as the Army transforms during the transition into the 21st Century.⁴

This is a theme supported by research into the causes of numerous military failures in war by Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, professors of strategic studies at the Naval War College. They classify the military failures in terms of failures to

learn, anticipate, adapt, or any combination thereof.⁵ In each military failure examined physical/organizational change could not occur until the existing organizational and personal paradigms were identified, challenged and changed. Changing these existing paradigms required intellectual innovation.⁶

Cohen and Gooch believe that intellectual innovation can be maximized and military misfortune minimized by an organization that is capable of learning, anticipating and adapting. ". . . Military organizations must reflect upon past experience (history) to gain an appreciation of the environmental conditions influencing the choices made that lead to defeat or victory. Learning from the past must precede and pre-empt defeat in the future.⁷ When military organizations look at future wars, they must anticipate the politico-military conditions of the war and consider the enemy's tactics to fully grasp how the different levels of war will interact to direct and shape each other.⁸ If an organization is to successfully adapt during war, then it must prepare organizationally to critically analyze the initial operational experiences. This analysis should determine the validity of the assumptions the theory, doctrine or tactics are based on, and the organization must adjust. The organization must be prepared to continue learning during war.⁹ How an organization learns from historical and recent experience impacts on how it anticipates the future and how it adapts now to function effectively in the current environment. (See Figure 1)




FIGURE 1

Learning, anticipating and adapting are functions of how individual people within the organization interact within the hierarchical structure. The norms that govern these three functions are driven by the institutional paradigms of interpersonal interaction adopted by the organization over time.¹⁰ The organizations that will excel in the future will be the organizations that discover how to broaden their institutional and members' paradigms of interpersonal interaction. Broadening these paradigms will increase the organizations ability to learn, anticipate and adapt at all levels.¹¹ These organizations will be known as "learning organizations" because the people will be "... continually learning how to learn together."¹² Learning organizations will be capable of continuously controlling change instead of reacting to change. Transforming the Army into a learning organization is the way to institutionalize the fostering of intellectual innovation.

This monograph summarizes recent personal development and organizational development theories and outlines the requirements for creating a learning organization in Section I. The Army's education, personnel assignment, and promotion systems are analyzed in Section II in terms of these requirements to determine how these systems affect the Army's effort to transform into a learning organization. The last section provides recommendations and identifies areas requiring further research to enhance the Army's transformation as it moves into the 21st Century.

SECTION I: THE THEORY FOR CHANGE

Cohen and Gooch's analysis challenges the paradigm that military misfortune is the fault of the commander. In fact, the key assertion of their analysis is, "True military misfortunes can never be justly laid at the door of any one commander. They are failures of the organization, not of the individual."¹³ Cohen and Gooch do not absolve commanders of all responsibility for military misfortunes. They do emphasize the need to examine the commanders' actions within the context of the organization in which they were developed and the impact the organization had on the commanders' physical, intellectual, and emotional abilities to act.¹⁴ According to Cohen and Gooch there is both a personal and organizational component that makes intellectual innovation either possible or impossible. There is evidence that by focusing on the principles of human interaction individuals can

broaden their personal and their organizations' paradigms of interaction. One leading authority in this area, Dr. Steven R. Covey¹⁵ focuses on the fundamental idea that human effectiveness is governed by principles. These principles are natural laws in the human dimension of life that are just as real and powerful as the laws of gravity in the physical dimension.¹⁶ He argues that understanding these laws and the process of developing the habits necessary to abide by these laws are the keys to broadening one's perspective on personal interaction and achieving personal fulfillment and success in life. Covey's theory illustrates the process by which individuals can develop these habits.

Dr. Peter A. Senge,¹⁷ another authority in this field, contends that individuals must master themselves before the organization can tap into their potential. Senge espouses the idea that organizations that learn how to synergize people's commitment and desire to learn from the lowest level worker to the highest level executive will truly excel in the future.¹⁸ Senge's theory builds on Covey's work by illustrating how an organization can tap into the potential of its members who are working towards personal mastery, to broaden the organizations perspective and enhance the organizations effectiveness.

A: COVEY'S PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY

Dr. Steven R. Covey identifies two fundamental but dichotomous approaches people pursue to achieve personal success. He identifies them as the "Personality Ethic" and the "Character

Ethic." The "Personality Ethic" views success as a function of personality and public image. It encourages the use of manipulative and deceptive techniques to gain friends or support by faking interest in their opinions or hobbies.¹⁹ The basic thrust of the personality ethic is ". . . quick fix influence techniques, power strategies, communication skills and positive attitudes."²⁰

"The Character Ethic" bases its success on the integration of habits based on human law principles into one's character. The "Character Ethic" teaches that the development of integrity and fundamental character strength is the only means to experience true success and long-term happiness. This developmental and integrative process requires personal commitment and time.²¹

Covey believes the first approach, "The Personality Ethic," is flawed because it promises the achievement of rich deep relationships with others without having to go through the personal work and growth naturally required to make these relationships possible.²² He explains the effectiveness of the "Character Ethic" by examining the power and impact of paradigms. He defines a paradigm as how we "see" the world in terms of perception, understanding, and interpretation.²³ Paradigms create the lenses through which we interpret the world. They shape how we see current reality and how we believe it ought to be.²⁴ These lenses are a result of one's culture, personal experience, and learning. We assume that how we see things is simply how things are. The assumption that our perception is

correct influences how we anticipate the future and adapt to the present; our attitudes and behaviors.²⁵ Therefore our character, what we are, is very much interrelated to how we see the world.²⁶

One only has to experience a paradigm shift to realize that it is possible for two people to look at current reality and perceive two completely different things. Both perceptions can be right, based on the lenses through which we view the world. To change our attitudes and behavior, how we anticipate and adapt, we must examine the basic paradigms from which those behaviors and attitudes flow.²⁷ Before we can change our paradigms, we must first realize they exist and then we must be willing to question and challenge them. By challenging our paradigms we will learn about ourselves and learn to see the world differently. We will broaden our perspective.

Supporting Covey's theory is the principle of process. He discusses the sequential stages of growth and development that children and adults go through. Each stage builds on the next. For an adult this development is fostered in terms of entering a relationship with a peer or boss, becoming a part of a group or learning to communicate effectively.²⁸ He implies, if we are willing to accept this principle of process then we must doubt the effectiveness of the personality ethic which attempts to short cut this natural process of personal growth.²⁹

Covey's methodology is " . . . a principle centered, character based, 'inside-out' approach to personal and

interpersonal effectiveness."³⁰ (See Annex A) To solve a problem or build a lasting relationship, we must first examine our paradigms, our character and our motives. We must admit that possibly the way we perceive the problem is the problem itself. We must focus on ourselves inside and be honest with ourselves before we can focus on someone else outside and be honest with them. Covey's habits follow the natural process of development.

Covey defines habits as the intersection of knowledge, skills, and desire. To create a habit requires the doctrinal, and theoretical paradigms, the what to do and why or knowledge; the ability to apply the knowledge, skill; and the motivation, the want to do, desire. By changing our habits and creating new habits we can continue to grow to new levels of interpersonal effectiveness. According to the inside-out approach, as we mature we pass through three stages of physical, emotional and intellectual growth. We grow from a state of dependence to independence to interdependence. (See Figure 2)




FIGURE 2

We move up this maturity continuum by maintaining a desire to grow and learn and acquiring the knowledge and self awareness needed to broaden our lenses.

In a dependent state we need or let others take care of us. We interact with others based on someone else's doctrine and interpretation of events. When we analyze these interactions we blame any poor results on everyone but ourselves. We can transition to independence in which we are self reliant, once we build the foundation of self-control, personal leadership, and discipline necessary to build solid relationships with others. We realize we are capable of interpreting reality for ourselves and determining how to apply our own doctrine of human interaction. When we analyze our interaction with others we examine it on two levels. First we determine if the manner in which we acted (application) evoked a defensive response then we determine if our doctrine of interaction (anticipation) caused us to judge prematurely.

As we strive for interdependence we focus on our ability to interact with others. We become intellectually and emotionally capable of accepting complete responsibility for our lives and our impact on others lives. We seek to combine our efforts towards growth with the efforts of others to achieve a synergistic effect. We realize we can challenge the current theories of human interaction based on the personality ethic and rescript those theories in terms of the character ethic. Because we are influencing others, ". . . the moment you step from

independence to interdependence in any capacity, you step into a leadership role."³¹ Sustaining our interdependence allows us to enjoy the fruit of deep relationships and meaningful interpersonal interaction.³²

Our physical, emotional and intellectual maturity do not precede in unison. Physical maturity is a process we do not control. We can control our emotional and intellectual maturation by mastering Covey's habits.³³ Covey's methodology is the means to develop the personal component so critical to intellectual innovation.

B: SENGE'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY

Senge believes that the five disciplines described in his book are, ". . . gradually converging to innovate learning organizations."³⁴ Senge examines the five disciplines of personal mastery, mental models, team learning, shared vision and systems thinking and explains how they can broaden the organization's paradigms of interpersonal and group interaction. He describes and redefines the role of the organization as well as the workers and the leaders.

Senge states that organizations learn only as a result of individuals who learn. Organizational learning is not guaranteed by individual learning. Yet, a lack of individual learning does guarantee a lack of organizational learning. Senge's concept of personal mastery, like Covey's theory, embodies constantly clarifying what is important as well as always striving to see

current reality more clearly. Senge agrees with Covey that individuals who achieve personal mastery take more initiative and see themselves as having a larger role and a deeper sense of responsibility in their work. Covey says they become leaders; Senge calls them learners.³⁵ Covey discusses the importance of self-renewal. Senge introduces a similar concept when he defines creative tension as the force that comes into play when an individual acknowledges a gap between his personal vision and the current reality. The tension is creative because it motivates the individual to continue learning how to achieve the vision. For this reason Senge identifies personal mastery as the spiritual foundation of a learning organization.³⁶ The continuous desire and ability of an organization's members to learn, establishes the upper limits of the organization's ability to learn.

Senge agrees with Covey's assertion that individuals who strive to achieve interdependence assume a leadership role. He states that the most powerful thing a leader can do to influence others to strive for personal mastery is set the example through his quest for personal mastery. The foundation of Senge's leadership strategy is providing a role model.³⁷

Senge introduces the concept of mental models to convey both organizational and personal tacit paradigms exist. These paradigms can not be broadened until they are identified by the organizational subgroups and examined for relevancy. The individual group members must know how to balance advocacy with

inquiry while engaged in dialogue for this to occur. The members must expose their thinking and assumptions to the others. The group can enter into dialogue or thinking together and challenge those assumptions and models and not each other.³⁸

Team Learning is the result of group dialogue. The members thinking influences and is influenced by others. Senge supports Covey's assertion that we can influence others once we demonstrate we can be influenced.³⁹ To enter into true dialogue all members of the team despite their hierarchical position or title, must be considered as intellectual colleagues and leaders. This eliminates the normal individual and group defensive behavior allowing the team to more easily surface their mental models. Team learning is critical because learning teams are the fundamental building blocks of a learning organization.⁴⁰

The ability to create and maintain a shared vision of the future has inspired groups of people throughout history. By articulating a vision that encompasses mutually agreed upon goals, genuine organizational commitment to the vision is created instead of just compliance. An organization can not depend on the arrival of a charismatic leader or a crisis to develop a shared vision. Usually once the leader and/or crisis passes, so does the vision. Organizations must institutionalize the process of creating and maintaining a shared vision by tapping into the visions' of its' members.⁴¹

Senge uses the example of the hydrological cycle or system to illustrate systems thinking. Rainfall, runoff, evaporation and

wind current are separate events that are distant in time and space yet part of a pattern that repeats itself. To understand an area pattern of precipitation, we must understand the flow of the hydrological cycle; we can not just study the individual parts in isolation. Senge contends that just as there are patterns in nature, there are patterns in organizational and human interaction. Systems thinking is based on 50 years of research aimed at clarifying the patterns of organizational and human interaction. If we understand the systems, we can influence the patterns and flow of interaction.⁴²

Personal Mastery motivates individuals to continually learn how they create their current reality. Team learning enables the group to determine how to overcome the individual weaknesses of their mental models and capitalize on their collective desire to learn. Team learning provides the group with the capability to challenge the organizational mental models and clearly define current reality. Knowing where they are, the group can now define where they want to go by building a shared vision.

Systems thinking is the integrative discipline. It provides the means to translate the theory into a doctrine that can be applied to identify how to influence the patterns of human interaction and maintain the creative tension between an organizations' vision and current reality.⁴³ Systems thinking sees the world holistically. It provides a framework for identifying interrelationships and patterns of change instead of static snapshots of events. Focusing on the patterns of change

allows us to identify the underlying structures and context/conditions of highly complex situations to determine where we can achieve high leverage."

Systems thinking differs from the systems analysis routinely employed by management analysts. Systems analysis is designed to handle detail complexity in which there are numerous variables and the causal relationships between the variables are easily identifiable and linear. "Pert" diagrams are an excellent example of a systems analysis approach to solving a detailed complex problem. Systems thinking deals with dynamic complexity in which the casual relationships between variables are subtle, hard to identify and non-linear. Developing a promotion system that rewards and encourages career progression through command and staff assignments as well as instructor assignments in the numerous army schools, is a dynamically complex problem."

Key to understanding systems thinking is the concept of feedback. Feedback is defined as any reciprocal flow of influence in a system in which each influence is both a cause and effect. This is possible because systems thinking see's the dynamically complex world in terms of circles of influence rather than linear progressive patterns like pert diagrams. The systems perspective forces people to realize they are apart of the feedback process not separate from it. Therefore they influence and are influenced by the system and share responsibility to varying degrees for any of the system's problems."

Systems thinking recognizes reinforcing/amplifying and balancing/stabilizing feedback processes. Reinforcing/amplifying feedback generates growth or decline where small changes in either direction are amplified into greater and greater growth or decline. An example of a reinforcing loop in action is the frequent pattern of leader development in which superiors do not recognize the impact of their expectations on subordinates growth. Superiors identify certain subordinates as possessing potential and lavish them with developmental mentorship. When these subordinates continue to perform superbly, the commanders feel their actions were justified and they provide additional mentorship. However, those initially perceived as having lower potential receive little or no mentorship. Soon the subordinates labeled as low performers become disinterested and create a self-fulfilling prophecy that in turn justifies in the superior minds the lack of mentorship.⁴⁷ Failing to recognize their pattern of leader development, superiors implicitly declare that only select leaders are worthy of developmental mentorship without clearly delineating the evaluation criteria for selection as one of the worthy.⁴⁸

Balancing/stabilizing feedback is generated by goal oriented behavior. Senge compares balancing feedback to a car's brake system. If we want a car to remain stationary the brakes will prevent it from moving. If we want a car to accelerate to the speed limit the brakes will allow it to achieve but not exceed the limit.⁴⁹ Balancing feedback is generally harder to detect

than reinforcing feedback because it prevents or limits action, making it appear as if nothing is happening.⁵⁰

In addition to the two types of feedback, system thinkers must comprehend the concept of delays. Delays occur when the influence of one variable on another is not immediate. Delays on balancing processes cause us to oscillate around our limit. Delays on reinforcing processes cause us to perceive a temporary advantage resulting in an escalation of our efforts. The commanders who see the immediate benefits of their selective mentorship but fail to see the long term damage of their neglect of the other officers are a perfect example of the influence of a delay on a reinforcing process.⁵¹

Systems thinking allows us to categorize and organize the conditions/context surrounding recent or past experience and identify detail from dynamic complexity. Understanding the type complexity we are reacting to, enables us to focus on discerning the structural patterns and then eliminating the structural causes of the problem instead of providing symptomatic solutions.⁵² Continued practice with systems thinking provides the tools necessary to anticipate rather than react to problems. Viewing an organization in terms of feedback loops and delays, allows us to discern the dynamically complex conditions influencing events. Understanding these conditions enables us to perform a pattern analysis of the numerous subsystems that makeup the organization so we can anticipate potential problems before they become issues.⁵³

Using systems thinking as only a problem solving tool fails to capitalize on the technique's greatest potential; generative learning. Systems thinking, through the integration of the other four disciplines, not only enables us to anticipate and adapt to the problems encountered in our current hierarchical organizations,⁵⁴ but simultaneously allows us to create new organizational perspectives in which innovative intellectual learning, anticipation, and adapting combine to control and manage change.

Leaders not managers create learning organizations. "They are responsible for building organizations where people continually expand their capabilities to understand complexity, clarify vision, and improve shared mental models - that is they are responsible for learning."⁵⁵ Leaders enable others to learn by designing the learning processes which facilitate the broadening of personal and institutional paradigms.⁵⁶ Leaders teach. They teach people how to master and apply the five disciplines. They teach people to view reality in terms of events (adapting), patterns of behavior (anticipating), systemic structure, and vision/purpose (generative learning.) They demonstrate by action that effective leaders understand all four levels but focus their attention on vision, the way of the organization, and systematic structure, the how.⁵⁷

Organizational leaders act as stewards, providing meaning and vision for the day to day and long term activities. The leader's vision defines where the organization is going and why it exists

within the context of it's influence on society and society's influence on it. The leader's vision acknowledges the organization is a part of and not separate from society. The leaders' designing and teaching efforts benefit the members of the organization and society. This link to society and the emphasis on empowering the organization's members through personal mastery and systems thinking, are key to maintaining the organization's creative tension. Every thing the members of the organization do at work and home contribute to the betterment of society and their own fulfillment because they are a part of and not separate from society.⁵⁸

C: THE REQUIREMENTS OF A LEARNING ORGANIZATION

Senge's theory agrees with Cohen and Gooch's analysis that intellectual innovation requires both personal and organizational components. Senge goes beyond Cohen and Gooch theorizing how to develop an organization that is capable of continuous learning, anticipation, and adapting. (See Figure 3)




FIGURE 3

His theory focuses on the intra and intergroup interactions that shape how separate organizational teams induce theory, deduce doctrine, apply doctrine, and analyze recent past experience. These separate teams form the organizational paradigms through which all feedback is filtered. The breadth of perspective for each team is a function of the breadth of perspective of the team members. Therefore members following Covey's methodology to achieve interdependence are essential.

The free flow of feedback through the entire system is necessary to constantly challenge the current theoretical and doctrinal assumptions and prevent the calcifying of the organizations doctrine. Additionally this feedback provides the key to identifying new emerging patterns of interaction or uncovering new systemic structures such as learning organizations.

If the organizational teams/paradigms are resistant to feedback/learning then the organizations ability to learn, anticipate, and adapt are inhibited. Current events keep an organizations doctrine grounded in reality. A holistic analysis of past and recent experience provides a vision of what is possible in the future.

Peter Senge quotes the CEO of Shell Oil Corporation Arle de Gues⁵⁹ who said, "Organizational learning occurs in three ways: "Through teaching [generative learning], through changing the rules of the game [anticipating], . . . and through play [adapting]."⁶⁰ This statement provides a framework for

outlining the requirements of a learning organization. Arie de Gues does not mention the first requirement of a learning organization, members committed to achieving interdependence or personal mastery, because without them you can not have organizational learning.

The second requirement of a learning organization is an education system that enables the organization to retain it's creative tension encouraging the achievement and sustainment of interdependence and personal mastery by its members. Covey and Senge agree that individuals who strive to achieve personal mastery are accepting the mantle of leadership. It is incumbent upon the education system to teach the other four disciplines with the aim of developing leaders who are designers, stewards and teachers.

However, even if the organization sets up the education system as described, it will be for naught if the members must compete against one another. "Competition has its place in the marketplace or against last years performance. . . . but cooperation in the workplace is as important. . . as competition in the marketplace."⁶¹ Both Covey and Senge agree that organizational structures can influence individual and group behavior. They believe that organizations must change their structures and processes of interaction to encourage cooperation not competition. This will maximize the potential of all members of the organization.⁶² The emplacement of win/win systems for compensation and personal management is the third requirement of

a learning organization.⁶³ Win/win systems such as these, provide a means to constantly "change the rules of the game" as the organization evolves to meet the dynamically complex forces it must face in today's world.

The most effective way to learn is through practice.⁶⁴ Just as athlete's and musicians must practice to develop and sustain their skills, so must leaders. The fourth requirement of a learning organization is to provide leaders at all levels with the practice/playfields necessary to generate future learning. Senge calls these practice/play fields micro-worlds. He states, " . . micro-worlds 'compress time and space' so that it becomes possible to experiment and learn what the consequences of our decisions are in the future and in the distant parts of the organization."⁶⁵ These structured learning experiences aim at identifying or discovering future strategic opportunities or discovering untapped leverage within the organization.⁶⁶

SECTION II: DOES THE U.S. ARMY HAVE ANY LEARNING DISABILITIES?⁶⁷

The Army's performance in Desert Storm was proof of the quality of the soldiers and leaders at all levels. The Army has an abundant supply of deeply motivated, energetic soldiers who are always striving to improve their effectiveness. Soldiers and leaders who are exposed to the latest development theories during the education process will move toward their quest of interdependence and personal mastery.

The Army's education system is one of the three pillars of the Army's Leader Development Program. The leader development program consists of education, unit experience, and self development. The program is based on the concept of progressive development. Officer's are taught the base skills and knowledge required to perform at a desired level. The officer is then assigned to a position consummate with his new skills and given the opportunity to continue learning through experience. Based on his superiors' and own assessment the officers pursues additional self development to improve his performance. Upon receipt of a number of successful Officer Evaluation Reports (OER) an officer moves to the next level of responsibility and the developmental process begins again.⁶⁸

The education pillar is critical since it is the first step of development at each level. The education will influence the initial lenses through which an officer views the rest of his development at that level. If the education system is going to sufficiently broaden the individual and organizational paradigms and create a learning organization then it must concentrate on team learning and systems thinking. An examination of the overall Army education system is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, a general critique of the Command and General Staff Colleges (CGSC) curriculum illuminates some pressing issues.

The primary focus of the CGSC Program of Instruction is the procedural and technical skills required to be a division, corps and joint staff officer. The methods of instruction include

lectures, individual and group practical exercises, quizzes, written reports and written exams.⁶⁹ The core courses' levels of learning cover the spectrum from knowledge through evaluation.⁷⁰

The instruction is geared towards the median level students.⁷¹ The initial core courses focus on the fundamentals of combat and logistic operations at the tactical level of war. The initial courses also include instruction on basic training management, military law, and leadership. The core curriculum then transitions to combat and logistic operations at the operational level of war in a joint and combined environment.⁷²

The methods of evaluation are objective written exams and subjective observations of class participation and group work. The evaluations orient primarily on individual effort. The evaluations of group work focus on the product and procedure and not the interpersonal process used while producing the product.⁷³ Also all academic awards reward individuals effort. There are no academic awards for group work.⁷⁴

CGSC, the transition point for officers moving to the field grade level of development, does not reinforce the paradigm of team learning so critical to the development of a learning organization. Progressive change in the manner a person interprets experience occurs in direct response to experiencing the limitations of ones current paradigms rather than being taught a better way of interpreting experience.⁷⁵ Structuring the CGSC POI to orient on the bottom fifty percent of the class

means that the top fifty percent is generally not granted the opportunity of experiencing the limitations of their current paradigms. By not conducting any practical exercises in which there is the opportunity for dynamic interaction between students acting as the opposing force (OPFOR) and students acting as the friendly force, students are not effectively forced to challenge the organizations doctrinal and theoretical paradigms.⁷⁶

Instituting a POI in which the goal is to develop competent corps, division and joint staff officers but these officers are never required to do a complete detailed staff estimate or write a complete corps, division, or joint task force operations plan (OPLAN) is counterproductive.⁷⁷ The axiom that "we must train the way we fight" should be modified to "we must educate the way we train." The first time a majority of CGSC graduates will participate in a complete staff estimate and help write a complete OPLAN will be when they are in their unit. This initial experience may occur during their units Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Warfighter Exercise. BCTP orients on evaluating the effectiveness of division and corps battle staffs and requires complete staff estimates and OPLANS. If this is the standard in the field then students should be held to this standard in the school house.

Finally, by focusing on content and procedure and not the interpersonal processes used to accomplish the training objectives, CGSC becomes a trade school providing skill based training. Army education under the Army's rubric of leader

development is supposed to expand an officer's frame of reference.⁷⁸ Skill based training programs do not significantly impact on a person's paradigm for interpreting experience and generating self motivation.⁷⁹ CGSC's contribution to leader development is marginalized.

The third requirement of a learning organization is the emplacement of win/win systems that promote cooperation not competition. Dr. Stephen Peter Rosen, Associate Professor of Government at Harvard states in his book, Winning the Next War;

Peacetime innovation has been possible when senior military officers with traditional credentials, reacting . . . to a structural change in the security environment, have acted to create a new promotion pathway for junior officers practicing a new way of war.⁸⁰

The key resources for peacetime innovation was talented personnel, time, and information, not money. Those senior officers who could attract and protect talented personnel were able to produce innovative military capabilities. According to Rosen, changing the rules in a military bureaucracy requires gaining control of the officer promotion system and changing the promotion criteria.⁸¹

Rosen's statements are an indictment of the strength of a bureaucracy. The new organizational theories identify bureaucracy as a major inhibitor of organizational learning. The top down directive method of change described by Rosen does not aim at organizational team building or aid in the development of a shared vision. Instead, it is clique building. Information is

not shared but withheld until the clique can use it to obtain maximum leverage within the bureaucracy. This process focuses on the win/lose paradigm of human interaction.³² The paradigm of win/lose pervades the Army's promotion system which is the key means of compensating an officer's service.³³

Promotion boards review all Officer Evaluation Reports (OER) in an officer's file to determine if their potential and performance over time warrant promotion and or command. Only an officer's immediate hierarchial superiors provide the written input on the OERs. No input is allowed from the officer's immediate peers or subordinates on the OER itself. The senior rater must assess each officer's potential and assign them into one of three board categories; above, below, or center of mass. A history of above center of mass OERs puts you on the "fast track" for promotion. With a history of center of mass OERs, an officer will be promoted to captain, maybe major but not selected for attendance at CGSC. A pattern of below center of mass OERs results in separation from the Army.³⁴ The organization has intentionally limited the number of officers who can receive exceptional OERs by monitoring senior rater assessments in terms of who is in above, below, and center of mass officer.

Senior raters and raters must critically assess an officers potential. Since the organization's promotion criteria are so broad it is incumbent upon the senior raters and raters to translate this into clearly defined subjective and objective criteria linked to their mission and communicate is to the rated

officers. Yet, data shows counselling is a broken skill in the U.S. Army. The data also shows that senior raters generally do not disclose their evaluative criteria for success to the rated officers during the rating period.⁸⁵ Ambiguous evaluation criteria and a limited number of superior evaluations generates interpersonal competition. A competitive interpersonal atmosphere detracts from a cooperative team learning environment. This can annoy officers and may lead to "cut throat" tactics to gain a better evaluations.

Interpersonal competitiveness becomes even more pronounced when the only pathway to success is through the progressive command of the limited number of tactical units from battalion to corps level.⁸⁶ In 1994 approximately 225 infantry lieutenant colonel (P)'s and colonels were eligible for brigade command selection.⁸⁷ Only 15 brigade command slots were available. So 15 out of 225 officers win and 210 lose. The 15 selectee's will have an opportunity to continue to advance. The other 210 officers will have other chances to be selected for brigade command but their probability of selection decreases with each selection board. If an officer does not command at any level from battalion to division, he has only a fifty percent chance of being promoted and will then be forced to retire.⁸⁸

The competitive working environment is further reinforced by the adoption of personnel management policies that do not allow an officer a second chance. An officer who receives consecutive command OERs and is initially rated center of mass, then above

center of mass has only a 50-50 chance of selection for CGSC.⁸⁹ If the officer is not selected for CGSC he can not recover because non-CGSC graduates are rarely assigned to divisions.⁹⁰ But even if a non-CGSC graduate is assigned to a division the chances of getting assigned to a branch qualifying job within the division are limited since the current trend is to assign only CGSC graduates as battalion/brigade S-3s and battalion XO's.⁹¹

Officers become aware early in their careers that one mediocre OER could mean not getting selected for CGSC. Not getting selected for CGSC signals the potential end of a career. Officers can rarely prove they have made amends for earlier perceived errors. This heightens interpersonal competition and detracts from cooperative team learning.

The fourth requirement for a learning organization is the development of micro-worlds where leaders at all levels can practice generative learning. Micro-worlds provide leaders the opportunity to practice formulating and implementing strategies and then see the hypothetical impact of their strategy on the organization. Micro-worlds can also be used to examine current strategies and doctrine to determine their present and future impact on the organization.

The Combat Training Centers and the Battle Command Training Program are examples of existing micro-worlds in the U.S. Army. These training micro-worlds determine the present state of the participating unit and identify areas of untapped leverage in the unit.

With the creation of Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) and the leadership and battle labs, the Army has taken steps in the words of the Chief of Staff General Sullivan, "To change the way we change."⁹² LAM and the battle labs focus on generative learning.⁹³ They will simulate different environments based on the perceived changes in the dynamics of the battlefield and then evaluate the impact on the Army. This will identify what must be done now to ensure the Army is ready to fight and win in the future.⁹⁴

The Army's work on developing and establishing micro-worlds is truly revolutionary. Micro-worlds such as the training centers contributed significantly to the Army's success in Operation Desert Storm. Development of LAM and the battle labs provides a means to maintain our doctrinal and technological edge into the 21st Century.⁹⁵

The Army's officers and soldiers are often lauded as the highest quality personnel in our history. These are highly motivated and capable individuals who for the most part are willing to strive for personal mastery and interdependence. Yet, using CGSC as an example, the Army school system fails to capitalize on this desire to excel. CGSC, a critical school in an officers career progression, fails to encourage personal mastery, teambuilding, development of shared institutional and personal visions, or systems thinking. The Army's promotion system, the method of compensating dedicated service, is based on competition not cooperation. This win/lose paradigm impacts on

how officers are rated and assigned as well as how they chose to lead.

In the opinion of General William DePuy, the performance and the level of battle participation of the army as an organization rose since World War II to the 1980s from twenty percent to sixty percent as a result of the Army's efforts in education and leader development.⁹⁶ Clearly, after examining the Army in terms of the four requirements for the development of a learning organization General DePuy's assessment that there is room and need for further improvement remains valid.

SECTION III: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Army must tap into the potential of its quality officers and soldiers and focus them on achieving personal mastery and team learning by improving the education system. The Army can improve the education system by introducing experiential learning as the primary mode of instruction at all residence army schools.⁹⁷ (See Annex B)

The Army identifies practical experience in an operational unit as a necessary means to solidify an officer's comprehension of the material taught in the school house. The education system can not be tailored to meet the individual needs of each officer. Therefore the Army has declared self-development as the most important aspect of leader development.⁹⁸

The concept of experiential learning challenges the assumption that officers can only gain practical experience in an

operational unit.⁹⁹ (See Annex B) This concept supports the Army's assumptions on the importance of self development and provides insight on how the organization can assist it's members self-development. Experiential learning transforms the classroom into an environment in which students can learn from each other while performing concrete group tasks. Experiential learning allows students to learn about themselves, encouraging personal mastery, because it requires students to expose their thinking and mental models to the team. This method of learning taps into the individual commitment of each student to facilitate team learning. The clearly delineated guidelines for team and organizational learning to occur are based on the Army values of courage, candor, commitment, and competence.¹⁰⁰ (See Annex F)

Experiential learning teaches students how to focus on content and procedure as well as interpersonal process to achieve team goals. Content Work deals with "what" has to be done in "what" format or sequence. Process work deals with "how" the team does the "what."¹⁰¹ Teaching leaders/students to focus on process and content is as required first step to breaking the paradigm of not challenging the system.

Using CGSC as a model, the incorporation of experiential learning into the curriculum, combined with tapping into the potential of the 21st Century classroom being explored by the Army's senior leadership¹⁰² would radically improve and alter CGSC as we know it today. Before officers could attend the residence portion of CGSC they would be required to complete a

detailed learner controlled program of instruction (POI).¹⁰³ This POI would be on a data base that would be accessible Army wide. The POI would focus on providing officers with the prerequisite knowledge and skills (content) needed to function in the primary staff positions as well as familiarize them with the other supporting staff positions.

The residence portion of CGSC would consist of a series of learning experiences focused around team learning as the group interacted (process) to achieve specific tasks relating to staff planning, change management, and strategic planning.¹⁰⁴ The residence phase would initially begin with a primary focus on assessing and increasing the officer/students personal mastery and then shift towards team learning. The learning experiences would teach the team how to learn through systems thinking; how to anticipate through pattern analysis, and how to adapt to the unforeseen and manage uncertainty.¹⁰⁵ Use of the organizational leadership for executives (OLE) micro-world as the model for the initial two weeks of the residence phase would incorporate a highly effective and organizationally accepted POI into the curriculum.¹⁰⁶ OLE would provide each student with the base skills necessary to continually assess their level of personal mastery and the effectiveness of their team throughout the residence phase.

Facilitators are a key element of the experiential learning process. Being a facilitator of an experiential learning course requires a high degree of personal mastery, interpersonal skills

and an indepth understanding of team building and group dynamics, more so than platform or small group instruction. These are skills we hope to develop in all our officers. However, being able to teach someone how to use these skills to accomplish a task is always more difficult than just doing the task ourselves.¹⁰⁷

Officers would require an extensive train-up prior to facilitating a course. With just a single pathway to success, through the rapidly dwindling number of tactical commands at every level, the system would have difficulty providing a steady flow of successful officers. It would be difficult if not impossible to provide an adequate train-up and sustain a steady state of available quality facilitators.

The perception that failure to command equates to failure, is dysfunctional because it contributes to the existing competitive environment. The Army's win/lose paradigm for promotion reinforces this dysfunctional perception. Since the number of tactical commands are decreasing with the Army's continuing downsizing it is time the Army redefined success and opened up alternate pathways to achieve that success. One alternate pathway should be success as a facilitator at CGSC or other Army schools and training centers.

The suggestion to allow the continued promotion of officers who served as instructors instead of commanding at every level may seem radical. However, Dr. Robert H. Berlin in his paper, U.S. Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography

points out that the size of the Army between the world wars limited the number of available command assignments. The Army compensated for this by assigning officers as instructors throughout the Army school system. Dr. Berlin states that his research indicates instructor duty was career enhancing for all thirty-four corps commanders in World War Two.¹⁰⁸ While all thirty-four corps commanders were instructors and served in staff assignments, only twenty-two had extensive command experience during this time period. Nine only commanded one or two units and three, including General of the Army Omar Bradley did not command between the World Wars.¹⁰⁹

In Dr. Berlin's opinion, "One reason for the vitality of the internal professional military education was the quality of instructors."¹¹⁰ Implementation of a win/win promotion system that builds upon the team learning experienced in the resident phase of CGSC and provides multiple pathways to success would succeed in reestablishing that "vitality." A promotion system such as this would provide the Army with the requisite flow of successful officers to act as facilitators.

Redefining success in terms of service as a teacher, commander, and a staff officer not just as a commander would imply that well-balanced officers should serve in all three capacities but not necessarily at every level. For example you could have officers who serve as company commanders, service school instructors, battalion executive officers, division staff officers, CGSC instructors and then as brigade commanders.

Allowing this sort of career progression would significantly reduce the need for competition between officers. When this career progression is coupled with the cooperative team learning experiences in the schools, a cooperative culture will become the Army norm, not the exception.

There are still issues that need to be examined before this sort of change can be undertaken. Yet the OLE micro-world and the group of facilitators that administer the course provide a solid foundation to build upon. The leadership battle lab provides a micro-world which could possibly model, test, and develop the CGSC school modules fairly rapidly. The leadership labs could facilitate the design of the outlined win/win promotion system and identify the assignment policies to make this or a similar concept workable and a reality in the near future.

Transforming the Army into a learning organization will allow the Army to institutionalize the fostering of intellectual innovation because learning, anticipating, and adapting to manage change are the norm. An individuals emotional, intellectual, and physical maturation impact on their ability to lead. If individuals can not learn then they cannot lead because they will be incapable of identifying their mental models and participating in team learning.

Covey's habits provide guidance on how to achieve interdependence and personal mastery. Senge's five disciplines of personal mastery, mental models, team learning, shared vision

and systems thinking outline how to tap into an individuals' desire to learn and build a learning organization.

The Army can easily meet two of the four requirements necessary to transform into a learning organization. The Army has qualified people who are motivated to strive for excellence. The Army's existing micro-worlds provide a generative learning capacity and the ability to perform pattern analysis necessary to fine tune or change the existing structure.

The Army's education system does not capitalize on the potential of the individual soldiers and officers. Restructuring the education system by combining the concept of the 21st Century classroom and the experiential learning method of instruction would encourage personal mastery, team development and revitalize the Army's education system.

The restructuring of the education system would require the restructuring of the promotion system. The Army would have to develop a shared organization vision and collectively define successful service in terms of instructor, staff, and command assignments. Restructuring of the promotion system would reduce competition and encourage cooperation through win/win policies. Reduction of competition reduces the fear and penalty of failure that inhibits innovative behavior. Reduction of the fear of failure facilitates and encourages the organizational members to challenge and change as necessary the rules of the game.

The vision of the Army as a learning organization in which intellectual innovation is continually fostered is powerful and

achievable. Further study and experimentation with the concepts of change proposed in this monograph will enhance and speed up the Army's transformation into a learning organization that is capable of managing uncertainty by learning, anticipating, and adapting to the dynamically changing world environment.

ANNEX A

Covey's Seven Habits

Habit 1: Be proactive - we must acknowledge our responsibility for our own life. Our behavior is a function of our decisions not our conditions. We must admit that our conditions today are a result of decisions we made yesterday. We have the responsibility and the initiative to use our conscience, imagination, and free will to act upon our conditions rather than have our conditions act upon us. Responsibility means that between a stimulus and our response, we have the ability and freedom to choose that response. In order to become proactive we must identify our circle of concerns; all those concerns we have an emotional or intellectual stake in. Then we must identify our circle of influence; those concerns which we can control directly by working on ourself and correcting a habit and those we can control indirectly by changing the manner in which we attempt to influence someone else. Habit 1 will allow us to begin to influence our conditions in the future.

Habit 2: Begin with the end in mind - Covey asks us to project ourself forward in time to our funeral and imagine what it is we would like people to remember about you. Identify what things we would want them to say in our eulogy. Now use these as the criterion to build our paradigm by which everything else we do in life is measured. Keeping that paradigm in our conscience and managing ourself each day to work towards achieving the

criterion will allow us to maintain a daily focus on what truly matters to us. This pattern follows the idea that everything is created twice. There is first a mental creation, a goal, followed by the second or physical creation, the achievement of that goal. Leadership deals with the first creation and provides purpose, direction, and feeling necessary to identify what we want to accomplish. Management provides control efficiency and rules that enable us to identify how to best accomplish our goals. Being proactive allows us to become our own first creator or our own leader.

Habit 3: Put first things first. Now that we took control of our lives and are providing our own leadership it is time to learn how to discipline or manage ourselves so we can accomplish the second creation.

Covey introduces the idea of fourth generation time management whose primary focus is relationships and results with a secondary focus on time. He introduces the time management matrix in Figure 4A which is broken into four quadrants.

THE TIME MANAGEMENT MATRIX	
Urgent	Not Urgent
I ACTIVITIES: Crises Pressing problems Deadline-driven projects	II ACTIVITIES: Prevention, PC activities Relationship building Recognizing new opportunities Planning, recreation
III ACTIVITIES: Interruptions, some calls Some mail, some reports Some meetings Procrastinate, pressing matters Popular activities	IV ACTIVITIES: Trivia, busy work Some mail Some phone calls Time wasters Pleasant activities

Figure 4A




Figure 4b

He explains the need to first focus on the issues in quadrants I & II, the urgent and important and the non-urgent and important issues by saying no to quadrant III & IV issues. Once we focus on quadrant I & II issues now we must solve our quadrant I issues and put our primary focus into quadrant II. This will allow us to achieve the quadrant II results shown in figure 4b which in turn preempts quadrant I issues. A quadrant II focus provides the discipline and enables us to effectively control our conditions so that we can achieve our mental creations or goals.

Focusing on the first three habits allows us to achieve the private victory of independence. We possess the foundation of self-control, leadership and discipline necessary to build solid relationships with others. Covey explains establishing a relationship with others in terms of opening a joint bank account for emotions. Covey identifies six ways to make deposits or withdrawals into the emotional bank account. They are;

- o Understand the individual - we must touch a person's deep interests, we must get beyond their facade.
- o Attend to little things - little kindnesses and constant courtesy are always appreciated.
- o Keep commitments - Promise only what we can deliver on; be honest or confirm our words to reality.
- o Clarify expectations - Ensure they are explicit and understood up front do not assume they are.

o Show personal integrity - This generates trust, integrity confirms reality to our words, for example, by being loyal to a person who is not present.

o Apologize - When we make a withdrawal - we are not perfect and when we make a mistake in one of the other five areas admit it and ask for forgiveness. Understanding these six methods of making deposits into our joint emotional bank accounts allows us to focus on maintaining the PC of those relationships necessary to achieve the P, the desired result of interdependence; Synergy, openness, and positive interaction with others. Covey states every problem with the production of our relationships is an opportunity to build up the PC of the relationship. How we react to the problem dictates the effect. If we react to the threat of the problem and become defensive or closed we are making a withdrawal from the joint account. But, if we remain open and attempt to identify the root cause of the problem we demonstrate our commitment to the relationship and make a huge deposit thus building up the PC. Thus, "... the moment we step from independence to interdependence in any capacity we step into a leadership role." This is because we are influenced by others. The next three habits will illustrate how to build up the PC of our relationships and generate the desired production.

Habit 4: Think Win/Win - This is a philosophy of human interaction that only an independent person can choose because it requires maturity and a desire to achieve mutual benefit.

Win/win and win/win or no deal are the only viable paradigms of human interaction in an interdependent relationship. Three other paradigms of human interaction, win/lose, lose/win, and lose/lose require someone to lose and the fourth paradigm of win focuses on just half of the relationship and results in a withdrawal from the emotional bank account. To achieve a win/win solution or to agree to disagree (no deal) requires the courage from both parties to explicitly identify their desires the consideration to truly understand the other sides feelings and the maturity to recognize good people can have a completely different perspective than us. Relationships that do not remain mutually beneficial will be severed. Win/win thinking generates cooperation instead of competition. Competition has a role in sports or the market place but within a relationship or an organization cooperation is much more beneficial. To pursue a win/win philosophy requires learning how to listen so that we can demonstrate we are considering the other party's feelings. Habit 5 focuses on learning to listen.

Habit 5: Seek first to understand, then to be understood - We get very little training on how to listen but we get years of training in speaking, writing, and reading. When we listen we tend to focus on replying rather than understanding. When counseling we respond in one of four autobiographical responses; we evaluate, probe, advise, or interpret. We evaluate from our frame of reference and we probe, advise, and interpret based on our experiences, behaviors, and our motives. Covey states we

need to listen empathetically, meaning we listen with our hearts and eyes as well as our ears. We study outward behavior and sense the feeling and meaning. We get inside the persons frame of reference and try to see the problem from their perspective before we prescribe a solution. "Because we really listen we become influenceable and being influenceable is the key to influencing others." Empathetic listening allows us to expand our circle of influence because people will be more willing to listen and understand us once they feel we have listened to and understood them.

Habit 6: Synergy - It means the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Synergy is a result of the other five habits. Synergy requires the willingness to value the difference in others and an acceptance of others diverse perspectives. Synergy focuses on combining these differences to achieve a greater understanding of each other and life. To create synergy we must truly be open and honest with others so that we can build teams and develop unity and creativity with others.

Once we experience the synergy of a relationships we have achieved the public victory of an interdependent way of life. In order to sustain our interdependence we must invest some time in maintaining the PC of interdependence ourself.

Habit 7: Sharpen the saw - Covey is referring here to achieving balance self-renewal. We do this by focusing on renewing ourselves in terms of our physical, intellectual and spiritual and social emotional dimensions. Maintain our fitness


and health (physical dimension). Seek to continuously expand our frame of reference, develop our mind (intellectual dimension). Provide purpose, direction, and motivation to our lives by staying in touch with our core values (spiritual dimension). These three dimensions focus on sustaining habits 1-3. Our social/emotional dimension focuses on habits 4-6. Our social/emotional life is a function of our interpersonal leadership, our empathetic listening, and our desire to establish meaningful relationships with others. Habit 7 allows you to sustain our interdependence and enjoy the fruit of deep relationships and meaningful interpersonal interaction.

ANNEX B

The Learning by Experience Model

This model is based on a cyclical learning process of five separate but interlocking procedures. The emphasis is on the direct experiences of the learner. Since experience precedes learning, the learning or meaning derived from any experience comes from the learner himself. An individual's experience is unique. No one can tell him what he is to learn or gain from any activity. It is up to the individual to learn.

Each CONCRETE EXPERIENCE is our entry point to the model.



Concrete Experience

The process starts with a concrete experience. The student becomes involved in an activity; he acts or behaves in some way or he does, performs, observes, sees, says something. This initial experience is the basis for the entire process

Publish and Process

Following the experience, the student discusses or "publishes" his reactions and observations with the others who have either experienced or observed the activity. Then the student explores and evaluates (processes) the activity.

Generalize

After the processing the next step is to develop principles or generalizations from the experience.

Develop Courses of Action


Generalized learnings often show that other courses of actions are appropriate if an event or experience is repeated differently. Using the knowledge obtained from the learning experience, students form an action plan for bringing about the desired outcomes.

Apply Courses of Action

The final step in the cycle requires using and testing the new learning or discovery. This is the experimental part of the experience based model. The using and testing the new learning or discovery. This is the experimental part of the experience based model. The using and testing, of course, becomes a NEW EXPERIENCE which starts the cycle over again.

EXPERIENTIAL & INTROSPECTIVE PROCESS

INTERPERSONAL PROCESS



NOTE: This model was adapted by OLE from David Kolb, Learning Style Inventory Technical Manual by the U.S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Training Center, Ft. Ord, CA (ST 26-250-6)

GUIDE LINES FOR ORGANIZATION/GROUP LEARNING

- Be honest with everyone, including yourself. (CANDOR)
- Stay here and how. (COMMITMENT)
- Speak for yourself. (COURAGE)
- Speak directly to the person addressed. (COURAGE)
- If something is happening that you don't like, take responsibility for doing something about it. (COURAGE)
- Take a risk (go beyond your "self-imposed" limits). (COURAGE, COMMITMENT)
- Remain sensitive to yourself and others. (COMPETENCE)
- Participate. (COMPETENCE)

NOTE: This material is copied from the Organizational Leadership for Executives "Course Introduction" Text pp. 3-5.

END NOTES

1. During this month alone, May 1994, South Africa elected a black president and the Palestinians were granted self-rule in the Gaza Strip. Two events that 2 years ago were unthinkable.
2. "Army Focus 93: Moving Out to the 21st Century." Edited by LTC Fred Treyz (HQ DA, Washington, DC: 1993), p. 1.
3. Alvin and Heidi Tofler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York, NY: Little Brown and Company, 1993) p. 21-22.
4. Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army, "Moving America's Army Into the 21st Century." Boston World Affairs Council Luncheon Speech at the Westin Hotel Copley Square, Boston, MA: 26 April 1993, p. 5.
5. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes; The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. 46.
6. Ibid. The French in June 1940 are the only exception to this statement. Since they were defeated and their country occupied they did not get the opportunity to recover from their initial mistakes.
7. Ibid, p. 245.
8. Ibid, p. 239.
9. Ibid, p. 236.
10. Chris Argyris, On Organizations of the Future. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1973), p. 12-17.
11. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, (New York, NY: Doubleday Publishers, 1990), p. 4.
12. Ibid., p. 3.
13. Cohen and Gooch, p. 3.
14. Ibid., p. 3.
15. Stephen R. Covey is chairman of the Covey Leadership Center and the nonprofit Institute for Principle-Centered Leadership. His firm teaches personal and organizational leadership development worldwide. He has a Harvard MBA and a doctorate from Brigham Young University where he is an adjunct professor at the Marriott School of Management. He is sought after

internationally as a speaker and author on leadership, personal effectiveness and change, family, and interpersonal relationships.

16. Stephen Covey, The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People: Restoring the Character Ethic, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 32.

17. Peter M. Senge is a faculty member of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and director of the Center for Organizational Learning at MIT's Sloan School of Management. He is also a founding partner of the management consulting and training firm, Innovation Associates. Dr. Senge has lectured extensively throughout the world, translating the abstract ideas of systems theory into tools for better understanding of economic and organizational change. His areas of special interest focus on decentralizing the role of leadership in an organization to enhance the capacity of all people to work productively toward common goals. Dr. Senge's work articulates a cornerstone position of human values in the workplace; namely, that vision, purpose, alignment, and systems thinking are essential if organizations are to realize their potentials. He has worked with leaders in business, education, health care, and government. Dr. Senge received a B.S. in engineering from Stanford University, an M.S. in social systems modeling and a Ph.D. in management from MIT.

18. Senge p. 34.

19. Covey, p. 18-19.

20. Ibid., p. 19.

21. Ibid, p. 18 and 32.

22. Covey p. 35

23. Ibid., p. 23

24. Ibid., p. 24 & 32

25. Ibid., p. 24

26. Ibid, p. 32

27. Ibid, p. 28

28. Ibid, p. 36

29. Ibid, p. 32

30. Ibid, p. 42

31. Ibid, p. 206.
32. Ibid, p. 50-54. Coveys states that by sustaining your interdependence you are sustaining your production capacity (PC) because it is your interdependence that allows you to produce the desired product (P) of deep meaningful relationships with others. He calls this the production over production capability balance or the P/PC balance.
33. Ibid, p. 46-50.
34. Senge, p. 6.
35. Ibid, p. 139-143.
36. Ibid, p. 7.
37. Ibid, p. 173.
38. Ibid, p. 9 and p. 174-204.
39. Covey, p. 257-258.
40. Senge, p. 9-11 and 233-269.
41. Ibid, p. 9 and 205-232.
42. Ibid., p. 6-7.
43. Ibid, p. 12-13.
44. Ibid, p. 68-70. During the recent SAMS BCTP Training Seminar from 11-15 April 1994 the BCTP observer controllers stressed the importance of the intelligence staff officer, G-2, focusing on patterns of enemy activity rather than just focusing on single events. The observer controllers stated that G-2s tend to spend too much time analyzing single events in isolation rather than identifying the patterns of enemy actions. They felt this was particularly true when trying to conduct counterbattery operations.
45. Ibid, p. 69-72.
46. Ibid, p. 75-79.
47. Ibid, p. 79-84.
48. Unpublished Data, Center for Army Leadership, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
49. Senge, 79.

50. Ibid, p. 88.
51. Ibid., 89-92.
52. Ibid, p. 128.
53. Ibid, 52-54. Also see footnote 39.
54. Chris Argyris, Intervention Theory and Method: A Behavioral Science View (Menlo Park, CA: Radison-Wesley Publishing, 1970), pp. 56-63. Also Argyris in, On Organizations of the Future, states on page 20, "What types of changes will be required if organizations are to be redesigned to take a more complex view of man into account? Broadly speaking, the answer is that organizations will have to make changes in their structure, technology, leadership, and managerial controls, that reverse the three basis properties in modern pyramidal systems. These are: (1) specialization of work, (2) centralization of power, (3) centralization of information and their concomitants of: (a) dependence, (b) low fate control, (c) impoverished work, (d) psychological failure, (e) psychological withdrawal, (f) "market orientation," (g) low openness, trust, individuality, (h) low risk-taking, learning and innovation."
55. Senge, p. 340.
56. Ibid, 341-345.
57. Ibid, 353-357.
58. Ibid, 345-352.
59. Ibid., p. 8, 16, 181, and 236. Arie de Geus was Royal Dutch/Shell Oil Company's Coordinator of Group Planning. His efforts to integrate systems thinking into the company culture is recognized by Senge. As a result of the company's efforts Shell, which had been ranked as the weakest of the seven largest oil companies in 1970, was able to grow during the OPEC oil embargo and emerge in 1980 as one of the largest.
60. Arie de Geus as quoted in Senge p. 313. The words in brackets are mine.
61. Covey, p. 230.
62. Senge, p. 53, Covey, p. 229.
63. Covey, p. 230.
64. James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner, The Leadership Challenge: How to Get Extraordinary Things Done in Organization, (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1987), p. 288.

65. Senge, p. 313-314.
66. Ibid., p. 316.
67. This title is based on a Chapter in Senge's Book, Chapter Two "Does Your Organization Have a Learning Disability?" p. 17-26.
68. DA Pam 600-32 Leader Development for the Total Army (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 31 May 1991), p. 14-16.
69. This data is based on a review of the Academic Year 1993-1994 syllabi for the following CGSC Core Courses: C310 Fundamentals of Combat Operations; C320 Corps and Division Combat Operations; C410 Force Projection of Operational Forces; C510 Joint and Combined Environments; C520 Operations Other Than War; C530 Application of Joint Operations; C710 Fundamentals of Senior-Level Leadership in Peace and War; C730 Training the Force; C740 Military Law.
70. Ibid.
71. This was the target audience identified by the CGSC CTAC Faculty during a follow-up briefing on 18 March 1993 in which the CTAC faculty responded to a briefing given by nine CGSC students (myself included) proposing changes to the CTAC POI based on their experiences.
72. Review of selected syllabi from the CGSC Core Courses in Academic Year 1993-1994.
73. Ibid. Based on a review of the Evaluation Methodology for each core course which is also included in each course syllabus.
74. There are numerous individual awards such as the Depuy Award, Master Tactician, and acceptance into SAMS but there are no formal group awards.
75. Philip Lewis and T. Owen Jacobs, "Individual Differences in Strategic Leadership Capacity: A Constructive/Developmental View," Strategic Leaders: A Multiorganizational - Level Perspective. Edited by Robert L. Phillips and James G. Hunt. (Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books, 1992), p. 135.
76. Timothy K. Nenninger, "Leavenworth and its Critics: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, 1920-1940." The Journal of Military History 58, Lexington, Virginia: Virginia Military Institute (April 1994), p. 225. The author discusses the use of two-sided tactical problems which he identifies as map maneuvers as one of the five means of instruction used in the interwar period. CGSC Syllabi Review. None of the PE's in the

core courses require the students to do a complete estimate or OP Order.

77. CGSC Syllabi Review. None of the PE's in the core courses require the students to do a complete estimate or OP Order.

78. U.S. Department of the Army Soldier Training Publication 21-III-MQS Military Qualifications Standards III (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (30 June 1993).

79. Lewis and Jacobs, p. 134.

80. Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 251.

81. Ibid., p. 251. Also Robert Allan Doughty in, Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919-1939. He states there is little evidence to support the idea that if the French had spent more money on defense that it would have resulted in fundamental changes in when the French created armored units, how they trained or in their doctrine, p. 183.

82. Covey, p. 205-234.

83. Jack Scarborough, "Revisiting the Military Stereotype," Journal of Management Inquiry (September, 1993), p. 267 and 269. He calls the Army's Win/Lose promotion system an inherent weakness. He states because individuals with spotless records are passed over, departing from the norms is terminal.

84. This data concerning promotion patterns of officers with above, below and center of mass OERs is based on a phone conversations on 6 May 1994 with a branch representative from the Military Personnel Command Center.

85. Unpublished data, Center for Army Leadership, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

86. Scarborough, p. 267. He agrees that the pyramidal rank structure intensifies the competition between officers.

87. This data is based on a conversation with LTC(P) Lewis who was one of the 15 selectees out of the 225 eligible infantry officers for brigade command.

88. This data is based on a phone conversation on 6 May 1994 with a branch representative of the Military Personnel Command Center who identified these as trends over the past 6 years.

89. Ibid. Also based on conversations this past year with four captains who had previously worked for me who had received their

first command OERs. Their OERs ranged from center of mass to above center mass and they were all informed that they could not afford to get a center of mass senior rater profile on their next command OERs or their changes for CGSC selection would be only 50-50.

90. Ibid. Phonecon 6 May 1994.

91. Ibid. Phonecon 6 May 1994.

92. Margret Wheatley, "Can the U.S. Army Become a Learning Organization?" Journal for Quality and Participation (March: 1994), p. 4.

93. Ibid. p. 4-6. The author quotes the CSA General Gordon R. Sullivan who explains that he created LAM as, "an evaluation vehicle to assess new ideas in real-time and shortcut Cold War policy decision methodologies." She also quotes the TRADOC Commander General Frederick R. Franks, Jr. to explain battle labs. General Franks said concerning change, "There came a point when I couldn't wait any longer. I decided to act as if the organization was already where it needed to be. Five laboratory environments were then created: places where issues specific to the changing dynamics and requirements of battle could be experimented with and their results moved swiftly into practice." The author identifies LAM and the battle labs as initiatives, "... that dramatically create the conditions of a learning organization. . ."

94. Ibid., p. 5.

95. Ibid., p. 3. The author quotes CSA General Sullivan who explained the Army faces, "Perhaps our greatest challenge since WWII: To master the elements of change and retain our world-class qualitative edge into the 21st Century." She then goes on to explain in the article that the CSA believes LAM and the battle labs are two key means of achieving this goal.

96. Romiel Brownlee and William J. Mullen, Changing an Army: An Oral History by General William E. DePuy, USA, Ret., (United States Army Military History Institute: Carlisle Barracks, PA., 1986), p. 202.

97. "Course Introduction" Organizational Leadership for Executives (OLE) (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Leadership, CGSC, 1994).

98. Major John F. Agoglia, "Leader Development: Leveraging Combat Power Through Leadership, p. 13-18.

99. OLE Course Introduction text, p. 3-4.

100. OLE Course Introduction text, p. 5.

101. Ibid., p. 1-2.

102. In a conversation with Dr. Roger Spiller in February 1994. He informed Major Kevin Smith and myself that the CSA General Sullivan had just held a conference with the Army's senior officers to discuss how the Army could capitalize on computer technology to put portions of various POIs on large data bases that could be accessed throughout the Army creating "Wallace Classrooms" or "The 21st Century Classroom."

103. Covey, pp. 224-226.

104. Change management and strategic planning are discussed in OLE but there is not a specific learning experience built in for these topics.

105. Senge, p. 52.

106. OLE is a required Leader Development Course for all Department of the Army Civilians in the grade of GM 13-15s.

107. The thaw/freeze model provides a possible framework for understanding why initially teaching a skill to someone else is so difficult. (OLE Influential Communications I, p. 3)

108. Robert H. Berlin, "U.S. Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography," Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, July, 1989, p. 13.

109. Ibid, p. 12-14 of the 3 who did not command during the interwar years two of them commanded at the company to regimental level in World War I from 1917 to Nov 1918.

110. Ibid., p. 12.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Argyris, Chris. Intervention Theory and Method: A Behavioral Science View. Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1970.
- _____. Organization and Innovation. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1965.
- _____. On Organizations of the Future. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1973.
- Barker, Joel Arthur. Paradigms: The Business of Discovering the Future. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1992.
- Brownlee, Romiel and Mullen, William J. Changing An Army: An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA, Ret. United States Army Military Institute: Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1986.
- Clark, Kenneth E. & Clark, Miriam B. Measures of Leadership. West Orange, New Jersey: Leadership Library of America, 1990.
- Covey, Stephen R. The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People: Restoring the Character Ethic. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1990.
- Cohen, Eliot A. and Gooch, John. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York: The Free Press, 1990.
- Doughty, Robert Allen. The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919-1939. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1985.
- Fuller, JFC. Generalship: Its Diseases, and Their Cure: A Study of the Personal Factor in Command, Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co. 1936.
- Jacobs, Owen T. and Lewis, Philip. "Leadership Requirements in Stratified Systems" and "Individual Differences in Strategic Leadership Capacity: A Constructive/Developmental View." Strategic Leaders: A Multiorganizational - Level Perspective edited by Robert L. Phillips and James G. Hunt. Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books, 1992.
- Kouzes, James M. and Posner, Barry Z. The Leadership Challenge: How to Get Extraordinary Things Done in Organization. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1987.

Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.

Rosen, Stephen P. Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.

Senge, Peter M. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. New York, NY: Doubleday Publishers, 1990.

The Learning Imperative: Managing People for Continuous Innovation. Edited by Robert Howard Harvard Business Review: Harvard Business School Publishing Company, 1993.

Tofler, Alvin and Heide. War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century. New York, NY: Little Brown and Company, 1993.

Monographs, Theses and Papers

Agoglia, John F., MAJ, USA. "Leader Development: Leveraging Combat Power Through Leadership." Monograph School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993.

"Army Focus 93: Moving Out to the 21st Century." Edited by LTC Fred A. Treyz. HQ DA, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Publication Print Command, September, 1993.

Berlin, Robert H. "US Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography." Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, July 1989.

Brooks, Vincent K. MAJ, USA. "Knowledge is the Key: Educating, Training, and Developing Operational Artists for the 21st Century." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1992.

Dixon, Richard J, MAJ, USA. "The Mind is the Key: Preparing Tactical Leaders for Operations Other Than War." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1993.

Gorman, Paul F., "The Secret of Future Victories." Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, February, 1992.

Hodges, Frederick B., MAJ, USA. "Lee Builds an Army from Malvern Hill to Second Manassas." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1993.

Jordan, Thomas M., MAJ, USA. "The Operational Commanders Role in Planning and Executing a Successful Campaign." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1992.

Kellar, Brian A., MAJ, USA. "Avoiding Surprise: The Role of Intelligence Collection and Analysis at the Operational Level of War." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1992.

Palmer, Peter J., MAJ, USA. "Developing Tactical Commanders at CGSOC for the Future Airland Battlefield." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1990.

Ritter, George P. LTC, USA. "Leadership of the Operational Commander: Combat Multiplier of Myth." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1993.

Smith, Kevin B., MAJ, USA. "The Calculus of War: The Role and Use of Quantitative Decision Aids at the Tactical Level of War." MMAS, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1993.

Stoner, John K., MAJ, USA. "Can We Talk? Transformational Leadership and Communications Technology at the Tactical Level of War." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1992.

Thompson, Philip S., MAJ, USA. "Leadership for the Future Battlefield." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1991.

Wolff, Terry A., MAJ, USA. "The Operational Commander and Dealing with Uncertainty." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1991.

Zajac, Daniel L., MAJ, USA. "War in the Heart and Mind: The Moral Domain of the Guerrilla Warrior." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1992.

Articles

Korfman, Fred and Senge, Peter M. "Communities of Commitment: The Heart of Learning Organizations." Organizational Dynamics, Fall, 1993, pp. 5-22.

Menninger, Timothy K. "Leavenworth and its Critics:
The U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, 1920-1940."
The Journal of Military History 58, April 1994, p. 225.

Scarborough, Jack "Revisiting the Military Stereotype."
Journal of Management Inquiry, September, 1993,
pp. 264-271.

Wheatley, Margret. "Can the U.S. Army Become a Learning
Organization?" Journal for Quality and Participation.
March, 1993, pp. 2-7.

Field Manuals and Circulars

"Course Introduction" Organizational Leadership for
Executives. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army
Leadership, CGSC, 1994.

DA Pam 600-3 (Final Draft) Commissioned Officer Profession
Development and Utilization. 1993.

DA Pam 600-32 Leader Development for the Total Army: The
Enduring Legacy. 31 May 1991.

FM 22-103 (Working Draft) Leadership at Organizational and
Strategic Levels. 2 July 1993.

"Influential Communications 1" Organizational Leadership for
Executives (OLE). Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army
Leadership, CGSC, 1994.

"Organizational Climate" Organizational Leadership for
Executives (OLE). Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army
Leadership, CGSC, 1994.

U.S. Department of the Army Soldier Training Publication
21-III-MQS Military Qualification Standards III.
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 30
June 1993.

Studies, Speeches and Interviews

Howard, Michael. "Military Science in the Age of Peace." The
Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture, 3 October, 1973.

Petit, John, Major. CGSC Personnel Services Division,
interview 6 May 1994.

Personnel Management Officials, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command. Alexandria, VA, as per phonecon, 6 May 1994.

Professional Development of Officers Study. CSA Study Group, Headquarters Department of the Army, 1985.

Sullivan, Gordon R., Chief of Staff of the Army. "Moving America's Army into the 21st Century." Boston World Affairs Council Luncheon Speech at the Westin Hotel Copley Square, Boston, MA: 26 April 1993.

U.S. Army Leader Development Study. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, August 1987.

Unpublished Material

Epstein, Robert M. The Theory and Practice of Modern War, December 1993.

Snook, Scott A. "Unrealized Potential; A Critical Analysis of the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC): Confessions of a Third Term CGSOC Student." 1 May 1992.

Memorandum for Majors John MacDonald, John Agoglia, John Scudder, Tim Touzinsky, Bill Gillen, T. J. Smith, Steve Lanza, Will Grimsley, dated 18 March 1993. Subject: Response to Student Proposals.